Article
CommunityJev Benchmarks & Evaluations
Jev as an LLM Safety Guardrail: An Empirical Study of Input Filtering, Selective Output Review, and Over-Refusal
arXiv paper evaluating Jev as a safety guardrail for a Qwen2.5-1.5B-based pipeline across 970 benchmark prompts, comparing an unfiltered LLM, Jev input filtering, and tiered input filtering with selective output review.
- Format
- Article
- Reading time
- 2 min
- Published by
- Community
- Added
- Nov 2026
Highlights
- Compares three configurations on 970 prompts: unfiltered LLM, Jev input filtering, and tiered filtering with selective output review.
- Harmful-prompt answers drop from 527/720 (73.2%) unfiltered to 17/720 (2.4%) with Jev input filtering.
- Benign-prompt refusals rise from 3/250 (1.2%) to 27/250 (10.8%) under input filtering.
- Tiered filtering yields 40/720 (5.6%) harmful answers and 10/250 (4.0%) benign refusals, with 79/970 (8.1%) prompts needing output review.
- Joint threshold optimization lifts macro-F1 from 0.9351 to 0.9512 while cutting harmful answers and review frequency at the same benign-refusal rate.
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The evaluation places Jev as a safety guardrail in front of a Qwen2.5-1.5B-based pipeline, comparing an unfiltered LLM, Jev input filtering, and tiered Jev input filtering with selective output review.
970 benchmark prompts in total: 720 labeled harmful (520 AdvBench and 200 XSTest-unsafe) and 250 XSTest-safe prompts used to measure over-refusal.
Across the 720 harmful prompts, the fraction recorded as answered falls from 527/720 (73.2%) without filtering to 17/720 (2.4%) with Jev input filtering.
On the 250 XSTest-safe prompts, non-answer/refusal increases from 3/250 (1.2%) without filtering to 27/250 (10.8%) with Jev input filtering.
It yields 40/720 (5.6%) harmful-prompt answers and 10/250 (4.0%) benign-prompt refusals, with 79/970 (8.1%) of prompts requiring output review.
Joint optimization improves macro-F1 from 0.9351 to 0.9512 while reducing harmful-prompt answers and output-review frequency at the same benign-refusal rate.
Matched-budget comparisons show modest additional gains over a retuned single gate on the evaluation data, but those gains are not consistently observed on a held-out split.
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