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Jev as an LLM Safety Guardrail: An Empirical Study of Input Filtering, Selective Output Review, and Over-Refusal

arXiv paper evaluating Jev as a safety guardrail for a Qwen2.5-1.5B-based pipeline across 970 benchmark prompts, comparing an unfiltered LLM, Jev input filtering, and tiered input filtering with selective output review.
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Added
Nov 2026

Highlights

  • Compares three configurations on 970 prompts: unfiltered LLM, Jev input filtering, and tiered filtering with selective output review.
  • Harmful-prompt answers drop from 527/720 (73.2%) unfiltered to 17/720 (2.4%) with Jev input filtering.
  • Benign-prompt refusals rise from 3/250 (1.2%) to 27/250 (10.8%) under input filtering.
  • Tiered filtering yields 40/720 (5.6%) harmful answers and 10/250 (4.0%) benign refusals, with 79/970 (8.1%) prompts needing output review.
  • Joint threshold optimization lifts macro-F1 from 0.9351 to 0.9512 while cutting harmful answers and review frequency at the same benign-refusal rate.

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