ringzerosec/jev-runtime-security
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Kernel-enforced runtime security for AI agents with eBPF/LSM: policy decides file, exec, package-install and MCP operations at the syscall, while Jev can run as an optional checks provider whose verdict can only raise severity. The Jev checks layer is off by default.
ringzerosec/jev-runtime-security
User repository on GitHub
Repo stats from the GitHub API, cached Oct 2026.
Runtime security for AI agents. Policy is enforced in the kernel, at the system call — below the agent, and below anything the agent writes. The agent's reasoning never gets a vote in whether an operation is allowed. OpenAI's Agent security in the enterprise states the problem plainly: A credential is not authorization. Access to a system doesn't establish that a given action in it was authorized. Context is untrusted. A repo, a web page, a tool result can each instruct the agent — and any of them can redirect it.
Quoted from the project's README. Read the full README.
Watch out
Licensing is split: Apache-2.0 except the GPL/ directory, which is GPL-2.0 for the BPF LSM programs. The README lists limitations including process-name-based agent detection, and Jev checks are off unless enabled.
Posts, threads, and videos about this entry from around the web.
YouTube: Kubernetes admission control with a decision model, fail-closed.
Hacker News: SafeDep Gryph plus Jev checks for compromised coding-agent behavior.
2 pointsDetecting Compromised AI Coding Agents with Jev and GryphRead the thread on Hacker NewsHacker News: Show HN: Agent Chaperone screens tool calls and results with Jev before the agent sees them.
sepehrsafari5 pointsShow HN: Agent Chaperone – Screen AI agent tool calls and results with JevRead the thread on Hacker NewsX: Secret detection with Jev, tested
Original write-ups on what this entry is for.
Posts from builders shipping with Jev right now.